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Abstract
In this paper we provide a framework that explains how the market risk premium, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between forward prices
and spot forecasts, depends on the risk preferences of market players and the interaction between buyers and sellers. In commodities
markets this premium is an important indicator of the behavior of buyers and sellers and their views on the market spanning between
short-term and long-term horizons. We show that under certain assumptions it is possible to derive explicit solutions that link levels of
risk aversion and market power with market prices of risk and the market risk premium. We apply our model to the German electricity
market and show that the market risk premium exhibits a term structure which can be explained by the combination of two factors.
Firstly, the levels of risk aversion of buyers and sellers, and secondly, how the market power of producers, relative to that of buyers,
aﬀects forward prices with diﬀerent delivery periods.
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1. Introduction
Commodities are a very diﬀerent asset class from the
more traditional classes of traded assets such as equities
and bonds. Commodities normally encompass physical
goods such as oil, gas, electricity, metals, agriculturals
and live stock. The physical nature of commodities is per-
haps one of their most deﬁning characteristics speciﬁcally
because it plays an important role in the behavior of their
prices in both the spot and forward markets.
Let us contrast equity forwards with commodity for-
wards. For example, if interest rates and dividends are
assumed to be deterministic, the pricing of equity forwards
isastraightforwardexercise.Simpleno-arbitragearguments
areemployedandthepricingisprincipallybasedontheabil-
ity to borrow money to purchase the underlying equity and
hold it until delivery. As a result, the arbitrage-free forward
price is the cost of borrowing net of dividends yielded by the
equity. With commodities one can in principle apply a sim-
ilar strategy to price forward contracts. However, the phys-
ical nature of commodities makes it very diﬃcult for two
reasons.First,thecost-of-carry(interestplus‘storage’costs)
is not straightforward to calculate or measure. Second, it is
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collection of dividends on equities), but this is also excep-
tionally diﬃcult to quantify or model.
The shape of commodities’ forward curves for diﬀerent
delivery periods has always been of utmost importance to
understand market players’ (producers, consumers and
speculators) ‘attitudes’ towards bearing risk in these mar-
kets. Forwards exhibit peculiar behavior depending on
the time or delivery period. A situation where forward
prices are above current spot prices is labeled contango
and it is normally associated with circumstances where
the immediate supply of the commodity is plentiful relative
to demand. Similarly, the situation where forward prices
are below spot prices is known as backwardation and it
is generally associated with circumstances of low current
supply levels and/or low inventory levels. One can deter-
mine whether contango or backwardation exists by simple
observation of the forward markets. For example, in elec-
tricity and gas markets one normally observes that, for
‘long’ dated forward contracts, markets are in backwarda-
tion and for ‘shorter’ maturities the market is in contango
(Cartea and Figueroa, 2005; Cartea and Williams, 2007).
Another quantity of importance that relates forward
and expected spot prices is the market risk premium or for-
ward bias p(t,T). This is deﬁned as the diﬀerence, calcu-
lated at time t, between the forward price F(t,T), at time




P is the expectation operator, under the historical
measure P, with information up until time t and S(T)i s
the spot price at time T.
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To the best of our knowledge, recent literature on com-
modities has not addressed the connection between the
market risk premium and market players’ behavior and
risk preferences. Moreover, it has not dealt with the ques-
tion of why and how in some commodities markets we
expect the market risk premium p(t,T) to change signs in
time T. The main contribution of this article is therefore
to address these questions and propose a framework that
allows us to establish explicit relationships between the
market risk premium, the market price of risk and market
players’ risk preferences. By doing so, this allows us to
explain the interesting connections between forward price
formation and its deviations from spot forecasts based on
the consumers’ and producers’ attitudes to risk.
To understand the importance of the market risk pre-
mium, it is important to point out that forward curves
are not forecasts of the commodity spot price in the future.
The clearing prices of forwards are the result of demand
and supply, which in turn are determined by the individual
characteristics of market players. Indeed the main motiva-
tion for players to engage in forward contracts is that of
risk diversiﬁcation. Producers have made large investments
with the aim of recouping them over a long period of time
as well as making a return on them. As with any other
investments, there is an incentive for producers to reduce
variability in their proﬁts by trading in instruments with
payoﬀs that covary with their proﬁts. Similarly, consumers
(which might be intermediaries and/or use the commodity
in their production process) also have an incentive to hedge
their positions in the market by contracting forwards that
help diversify their risks.
The relative appetite of producers and consumers for
risk-diversiﬁcation has a temporal dimension to it. Varia-
tions in this appetite for risk diversiﬁcation will be evident
in the diﬀerent levels of market exposure chosen by produc-
ers and consumers and in the diﬀerent levels chosen by
members within each of these groups. For example a pro-
ducer will generally be exposed to market uncertainty for
a longer period of time, perhaps determined by the remain-
ing life of its assets, whilst consumers will tend to make
decisions based on a shorter time scale. In other words,
the gains in terms of risk-diversiﬁcation for consumers
and producers will vary across time, therefore having a ﬁrst
order impact on forward clearing prices.
In this article we argue that it is precisely these diﬀer-
ences in the desire to hedge positions and diversify risk that
explain the market risk premium and its sign. Intuitively,
the further out one looks into the market, the less incentiv-
ized consumers are to contract commodity forwards; how-
ever the producers’ desire to hedge does not diminish as
quickly. We associate situations where p(t,T) > 0 (a posi-
tive market risk premium) with markets where the consum-
ers’ desire to cover their positions ‘outweighs that of the
producers. Conversely situations where p(t,T) < 0 (a nega-
tive market risk premium) result when the producers’ desire
to hedge their positions outweighs that of the consumers.
In order to explain the market risk premium and the
driving forces that give rise to it we organize the rest of
the article as follows. Section 2 discusses the notion of a rep-
resentative producer and a representative consumer. Based
on their preferences we calculate an attainable set of for-
ward prices where the two representative agents are willing
to trade forward contracts. Section3 discusses clearing mar-
ket forward prices and the relative ‘market power’ agents
have over these prices. Section 4 examines the market price
of risk and market risk premium implied by our model
under diﬀerent assumptions. Section 5 applies our model
to German electricity data and Section 6 concludes.
2. Representative agents, price dynamics and forward price
bounds
In this section we describe producers’ and consumers’
preferences via the utility function of two representative
agents. As an example we look at the wholesale electricity
markets where we model the dynamics of the spot price as
a stochastic process. Agents must decide how to manage
their exposure to the spot and forward markets for every
2 Note that it is incorrect to say that when p(t,T) < 0 (resp. p(t,T)>0 )
the forward curve is in contango (resp. backwardation). Moreover, S(t)i s
not generally a martingale under P.
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of his future production, which cannot be predicted with
total certainty, will he wish to sell on the forward market
or, when the time comes, sell it on the spot market. Simi-
larly, the consumer must decide how much of her future
needs, which cannot be predicted with full certainty either,
will be acquired via the forward markets and how much
on the spot. Clearly, as described above, both agents have
the incentive to enter the forward market in the interest of
risk diversiﬁcation. We approach this ﬁnancial decision
and equilibrium price formation in two steps. First, we
determine the forward price that makes the agents indiﬀer-
ent between the forward and spot market and, second, we
discuss how the relative willingness of producers and con-
sumers to hedge their exposures determines market clearing
prices.
We assume that the risk preferences of the representative
agents are expressed in terms of an exponential utility func-
tion parameterized by the risk aversion constant c >0 ;
UðxÞ¼1   expð cxÞ:
We let c:=cp for the producer and c:=cc for the con-
sumer. The two agents can choose whether to act in the
spot or the forward market. The forward market consists
of contracts delivering the spot (physically, or in money
terms) over a given delivery period. Typical examples can
be the electricity or gas markets. In the latter the forward
contracts have a monthly delivery period, while in the elec-
tricity market, which will be the particular case discussed in
the remaining of this article, the contracts may have diﬀer-
ent periods of settlement, ranging from daily, through
weekly and up to even yearly.
We want to derive bounds for forward prices through
the principle of certainty equivalence between the two mar-
kets. In particular, we will obtain an upper bound, given by
the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay before
switching to the spot market, and a lower bound given
by the producer’s lowest forward price he is willing to trade
at before switching to the spot market. These two bounds
restrict forward prices to a set of feasible forward equilib-
rium prices and we postpone until Section 3 the discussion
of how market clearing forward prices are singled out from
this feasible set.
2.1. Producers and consumers forward price bounds
Let ðX;F;PÞ be a probability space equipped with a ﬁl-
tration Ft. Following Lucı ´a and Schwartz (2002) and
Benth et al. (2007) we assume that the electricity spot price








where K(t) is the deterministic seasonal spot price level,
while Xi(t)a n dYj(t) are the solutions to the stochastic dif-
ferential equations
dX iðtÞ¼  aiX iðtÞdt þ riðtÞdBiðtÞ; ð2:2Þ
and
dY jðtÞ¼  bjY jðtÞdt þ dLjðtÞ: ð2:3Þ
Here, Bi(t), i =1 ,...,m, are standard independent Brown-
ian motions and Lj(t), j =1 ,...,n are independent Le ´vy
processes.
3 Let ri(t) be (possibly seasonal) deterministic
volatility functions. The processes Yj(t) are zero-mean
reverting processes responsible for the spikes or large devi-
ations which revert at a fast rate bj > 0, while Xi(t) are zero-
mean reverting processes that account for the normal
variations in the spot price evolution with mean-reversion
ai >0 .
We suppose that the Le ´vy processes are exponentially




ee jz‘jðdzÞ < 1; ð2:4Þ
for all e j 6 j and j =1 ,...,n. This implies that the spot
price process S(t) has exponential moments up to order
j, and that the log-moment generating functions deﬁned by
/jðxÞ¼lnE e
xLjð1Þ   
; j ¼ 1;...;n; ð2:5Þ
exist for jxj 6 j, where ‘j is the Le ´vy measure of the process
Lj(t). In the sequel we shall assume that j is suﬃciently
large to make the necessary exponential moments of Lj(t)
ﬁnite.
Assume that the producer will deliver the spot over the
time interval [T1,T2]. He has the choice to deliver the pro-
duction in the spot market, where he faces uncertainty in
the prices over the delivery period, or to sell a forward con-
tract with delivery over the same period. The producer
takes this decision at time t 6 T1.
We determine the forward price that makes the producer
indiﬀerent between the two alternatives, denoted by
Fpr(t,T1,T2), from the equation
1   E







¼ 1   E










T 2   T 1
  lnE









where for simplicity we have assumed that the risk-free
interest rate is zero. Note that
R T2
T1 SðuÞdu is what the pro-
3 In commodities markets one can expect to observe seasonal jumps. In
this case we may use inhomogeneous Le ´vy or Sato processes which are
processes with independent increments (Cont and Tankov, 2004; Sato,
1999). Only minor technical changes in what follows are required.
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market over the delivery period [T1,T2], while he receives
(T2 T1)Fpr(t,T1,T2) from selling it on the forward market.
In the Proposition below we employ the spot dynamics
(2.1) to explicitly calculate the indiﬀerence forward price.
For ease of presentation we introduce the notation for
the following functions. For i =1 ,...,m and j =1 ,...,n,
  aiðs;T 1;T 2Þ¼
1
ai e aiðT1 sÞ   e aiðT2 sÞ   
; s 6 T 1;
1
ai 1   e aiðT2 sÞ   




  bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ¼
1
bj e bjðT1 sÞ   e bjðT2 sÞ   
; s 6 T 1;
1
bj 1   e bjðT2 sÞ   





Proposition 2.1. The price for which the producer is indif-
ferent between the forward and spot market is given by
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ
¼
1






  aiðt;T 1;T 2Þ





  bjðt;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
Y jðtÞ 
cp




















/j  cp  bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ
  
ds;
where   ai and   bj are given by (2.7) and (2.8), respectively.
Proof. Suppose for simplicity that m = n = 1. We calculate













Inserting the explicit dynamics of X(u) and appealing to the





















¼ XðtÞ  aðt;T 1;T 2Þþ
Z T2
t
rðsÞ  aðs;T 1;T 2ÞdBs:





YðuÞdu ¼ YðtÞ  bðt;T 1;T 2Þþ
Z T2
t
  bðs;T 1;T 2ÞdLðsÞ:
Thus, since X(t) and Y(t) are measurable with respect to Ft
and using the independent increment properties of the
Brownian motion and the Le ´vy process, we get,







¼ exp  cpr
Z T2
T1
KðuÞdu þ XðtÞ  aðt;T 1;T 2Þ
   
þ YðtÞ  bðt;T 1;T 2Þ
  
  E exp  cpr
Z T2
t
rðsÞ  aðs;T 1;T 2ÞdBs
     
  E exp  cpr
Z T2
t
  bðs;T 1;T 2ÞdLðsÞ
     
;
¼ exp  cpr
Z T2
T1
KðuÞdu þ XðtÞ  aðt;T 1;T 2Þ
   

















/ð cpr  bðs;T 1;T 2ÞÞds
  
:
Thus, the Proposition is proved after taking logarithms and
dividing by the risk aversion and length of the delivery per-
iod. h
Before proceeding we can interpret how jumps in the
model aﬀect the indiﬀerence price calculated in Proposition
2.1 for the producer. For simplicity, if we assume that for
the jump processes LjðtÞ;j ¼ 1;   ;n, each process can only
jump either up or down it is straightforward to see how
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ is aﬀected by each jump process. Suppose
LjðtÞ is a process of only positive jumps. Then, the log-
moment generating function /jðxÞ of LjðtÞ is an increasing
function with /jð0Þ¼0. Thus, when x < 0, /jðxÞ < 0, and
since   bj is positive, we have that the argument of /jð Þ in
the indiﬀerence price of the producer is negative, and thus
the jump process LjðtÞ causes an increase in the indiﬀerence
forward price. On the other hand, if LjðtÞ only exhibits neg-
ative jumps, we see that the indiﬀerence price is pushed
downwards. This is intuitively clear, because the producer
is willing to accept lower forward prices when there is a risk
of price drops in the spot market, whereas positive price
spikes work to the advantage of the producer, and he will
be more reluctant to enter forward contracts that miss
opportunities where he might be better-oﬀ selling in the
spot market.
The consumer will derive the indiﬀerence price from the
incurred expenses in the spot or forward market, which
entails
1   E




     
jFt
  
¼ 1   E
P exp  ccð ðT 2   T 1ÞF cðt;T 1;T 2Þ ð ÞÞjFt ½  ; ð2:9Þ
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We calculate the following price for the consumer.
Proposition 2.2. The price that makes the consumer indif-
ferent between the forward and the spot market is given by
F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼
1






  aiðt;T 1;T 2Þ





  bjðt;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
Y jðtÞþ
cc




















/j cc  bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ
  
ds:
Proof. The proof is similar as in the producer’s case. h
Note that the producer prefers to sell his production in
the forward market as long as the market forward price
Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ is higher than F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ. On the other hand,
the consumer prefers the spot market if the market forward
price is more expensive than his indiﬀerence price
F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ. Thus, we have the bounds
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ 6 Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ 6 F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ: ð2:11Þ
Letting the risk aversion of the producer go to zero, we
end up with the expected earnings from selling in the spot
market, also known as the forecasted forward price. We
observe the same with the indiﬀerence price of the con-
sumer when her risk aversion tends to zero.
Proposition 2.3. It holds
lim
cp;c#0
F pr;cðt;T 1;T 2Þ
¼ E
P 1














  aiðt;T 1;T 2Þ




  bjðt;T 1;T 2Þ








T 2   T 1
Z T2
t
  bjðs;T 1;T 2Þds:
Moreover, we ﬁnd that
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ 6 E
P 1





6 F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ:
Proof. The ﬁrst part is straightforward. The second part
results from applying Jensen’s inequality. h
3. Forward price and the market power
Inequality (2.11) clearly indicates a range of prices
where the producer and consumer are willing to attain a
deal. Aggregate demand and supply will ultimately deter-
mine the clearing forward prices within this range.
Previously we mentioned that the ‘appetite’ for risk diver-
siﬁcation varies across consumers and producers, depend-
ing on their degree of risk-aversion. Moreover, it seems
reasonable to assume that the desire to hedge exposure to
market uncertainties will also vary with the horizon agents
are looking at. In circumstances where there are not a large
number of consumers hedging long-term positions, whilst
at the same time producers are eager to hedge their expo-
sure, we say that consumers have market power. Similarly,
in situations (usually short-term horizons) where a large
amount of consumers come to market to cover their posi-
tions, the balance of power tilts over to the producers.
We introduce the deterministic function pðt;T 1;T 2Þ2
½0;1  describing the market power of the representative pro-
ducer which therefore depends on time t and delivery per-
iod. If the producer has full market power, corresponding
to pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼1, he can charge the maximum price possi-
ble in the forward market. This will be equal to the maxi-
mum price that the consumer can accept, namely
F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ, since the consumer will leave the forward mar-
ket for any higher price. On the other hand, if the consumer
has full power, ie pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼0, she will drive the forward
price as far down as possible which corresponds to
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ. For any market power 0 < pðt;T 1;T 2Þ < 1,
the forward price F
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ is deﬁned to be
F
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼pðt;T 1;T 2ÞF cðt;T 1;T 2Þ
þð 1   pðt;T 1;T 2ÞÞF prðt;T 1;T 2Þ: ð3:1Þ
In the most general setting, it would be possible to allow
for a stochastic market power, being for instance depen-
dent on the spot price dynamics. However, in this paper
we shall constrain ourselves to the much simpler case of
a deterministic market power. In some examples we con-
sider it as a constant for simplicity, but in the empirical
study of Section 5 we ﬁnd evidence of a term structure
for the market power.
The explicit dynamics for the forward price are easily
stated as:










  aiðt;T 1;T 2Þ





  bjðt;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
Y jðtÞ
þ
pðt;T 1;T 2Þðcpr þ ccÞ cpr
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pðt;T 1;T 2Þ





/jðcc  bjðs;T 1;T 2ÞÞds
 
1   pðt;T 1;T 2Þ






/jð cc  bjðs;T 1;T 2ÞÞds
for 0 6 t 6 T 1 < T 2.
Given the market power pðt;T 1;T 2Þ, F
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ is the
price that the consumer and producer agree upon in the
market. Since pðt;T 1;T 2Þ2½ 0;1 , this forward price will
be in between the producer’s and the consumer’s indiﬀer-
ence price, so both are willing to accept such a price.
Let us discuss the correlation structure between forward
contracts with diﬀerent delivery periods. For simplicity we
start with the case of no jumps (m = 0), and consider for-
ward prices for two contracts with non-overlapping deliv-
ery periods ½T 1;T 2  and ½T 3;T 4 . By the explicit form of
F
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ and the independence of the Brownian
motions, we easily calculate
Cov F
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ;F




  aiðt;T 1;T 2Þ  aiðt;T 3;T 4Þ







The correlation between two contracts can be estimated
from market price data, and thus we can estimate the
speeds of mean reversion ai by calibrating the theoretical
correlation to the empirical. Taking jumps into account
will give rise to a structure where we can include the possi-
bility of jump correlation between forward contracts. We
see that it is the multi-factor spot model which implies
the correlation structure for the forward contracts. This
resembles the market models in ﬁxed-income theory, the
so-called LIBOR models, where one models each LIBOR
rate separately, and include a correlation structure among
the diﬀerent rates. Further, it is also a known fact that for-
ward contracts in energy markets are not perfectly corre-
lated, but each contract has its intrinsic risk. Note that
the market power function is not contributing to the corre-
lation between two contracts.
4. The market price of risk and market risk premium
The standard way to price a forward contract is to ﬁnd
the conditional risk-neutral expected value of the future
delivery from the contract. The risk-neutral probability is
usually chosen to be related to what is called the market
price of risk, which can be seen as a drift adjustment in
the dynamics of an asset to reﬂect how investors are com-
pensated for bearing risk when holding the asset.
4 One of
the peculiarities of commodities markets is that the market
price of risk may be either positive or negative depending
on the time horizon considered. In Schwartz (1997) the cal-
ibration of one-factor models to futures prices of oil and
copper delivered negative market prices of risk in both
cases. Cartea and Figueroa (2005) model England and
Wales wholesale electricity prices and estimate a negative
market price of risk. Cartea and Williams (2007) model
gas prices and forward contracts where a positive market
price of risk for long-term contracts is observed and for
short-term contracts the market price of risk, although
positive on average, changes signs across time. In this sec-
tion we want to relate the market power pðt;T 1;T 2Þ to the
market price of risk. By working with a parametrization of
the market price of risk via a class of risk-neutral probabil-
ities introduced by an Esscher transform, we shall see that
there are explicit connections between the market power
and both the market price of risk and the market risk pre-
mium. Further, to ensure an arbitrage-free forward mar-
ket, we need to have certain conditions on the number of
factors and contracts traded in the market. In commodities
markets, especially electricity models, the connection
between the physical and risk-neutral measure is usually
performed by introducing a correction in the drift of the
physical process to reﬂect how market participants are
compensated for bearing risk, see for example (Schwartz,
1997; Schwartz and Smith, 2000; Lucı ´a and Schwartz,
2002; Cartea and Figueroa, 2005; Cartea and Williams,
2007). We point out that this widely employed change of
measure in the literature is the result of applying the
Esscher transform to the physical measure which is what
we propose to use in this article.
Suppose that we want to price a forward contract with











where we use F
Q to indicate the dependency on the chosen
risk-neutral probability Q.
We parameterize the market price of risk by introducing
a probability measure Q
h :¼¼ QB   QL, where QB is a
Girsanov transform of the Brownian motions BiðtÞ, QL is
an Esscher transform of the jump processes LjðtÞ,a n dh
is an R
nþm-valued function describing the market price of
risk. We deﬁne the measure change as follows. For t 6 T,
with T P T 2 being a ﬁnite time horizon encapsulating all
the delivery periods in the market, let the probability QB























where we have supposed that the functions hB;i=ri,
i ¼ 1;...;m, are square integrable over ½0;T . This measure
change in the Wiener coordinates is given by the Girsanov
transform,
4 Note that the market price of risk is not what we have deﬁned as the
market risk premium.




where W iðtÞ become Brownian motions on ½0;T ;i ¼
1;...;m. The functions hB;i represent the compensation
market players obtain for bearing the risk introduced by
the non-extreme variations in the market, i.e. the diﬀusion
component. We let it be time dependent to allow for vari-
ations across diﬀerent seasons throughout the year. Later,
we shall see that it could even be dependent on the delivery
period, indicating that the market price of diﬀusion risk de-
pends on the forward under consideration. This Girsanov
change gives the dynamics (for 1 6 i 6 m)
dX iðtÞ¼ hB;iðtÞ aiX iðtÞ ðÞ dt þ riðtÞdW iðtÞ;
and thus we have added a time-dependent level of mean-
reversion to the processes X iðtÞ.














for t 6 T 2, and let the density process for the Radon–Niko-




       
Ft
¼ ZLðtÞ:
This is the so-called Esscher transform, and the time depen-
dent functions hL;jðtÞ are the market prices of jump risk. We
let h :¼ð hB;hLÞ, where hB :¼ð hB;iÞ
m
i¼1 and hL :¼ð hL;jÞ
n
j¼1.
The density process of the probability Q
h becomes
ZðtÞ :¼ ZBðtÞZLðtÞ. Further, we denote by E
Qh
the expecta-
tion with respect to the probability measure Q
h.
The forward price F
h resulting from the market price of
risk speciﬁcation given by Q
h is derived in the next
Proposition.
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  aiðs;T 1;T 2Þ










  bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
ds: ð4:1Þ
for 0 6 t 6 T 1 < T 2.
Proof. For simplicity suppose m ¼ n ¼ 1. In line with the
calculations for the producer’s and consumer’s indiﬀerence













 aðu sÞdW ðsÞ;
for u P t, we ﬁnd
E
Qh 1
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T 2   T 1
þ YðtÞ
  bðt;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
þ
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By Bayes’ Theorem and the independent increment prop-
erty of the Le ´vy process, we see that the expectation in
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After reorganizing the integrals the result follows. h
To gain insight into how the market risk premium
depends on diﬀusion and jump risk we look at the follow-
ing two corollaries. The ﬁrst one assumes that the market
price of jump risk be zero. The second one assumes that
the market price of diﬀusion risk is zero.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that the market price of jump risk is















  aiðs;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
ds:
Proof. This is straightforward from the results above. h
Thus, from this we see that when market players are not
compensated for bearing jump risk, the market risk pre-
mium is positive as long as






  aiðs;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
ds
is positive. As a particular case we can assume all hB;iðtÞ’s to
be positive constants which yields a positive market price
of risk since   ai are positive functions for all s 6 T 2. How-
ever, in the more general setting, one can obtain a change
in the sign of the market risk premium over time t by
appropriate speciﬁcation of the functions hB;iðtÞ. Further-
more, although changes in the sign of the market price of
risk are also of particular interest, it is clear that a change
in the sign of the market prices of risk hB;iðtÞ does not al-
ways imply a change in the sign of the market risk
premium.
Now we turn our attention to the case with no diﬀusion
market price of risk, i.e. hB;iðtÞ¼0 for all i ¼ 1;...;m.




















no   bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2  T 1
ds:
Proof. Follows from the results above. h









jðhL;jðsÞÞ   /
0
jð0Þ
no   bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2   T 1
ds;
and even if we assume constant and positive hL;j > 0, the
sign of pðt;T 1;T 2Þ will depend on the monotonicity of /
0
j.
In general, the sign of the market risk premium will result




Finally, when both the market price of jump and diﬀu-
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no   bjðs;T 1;T 2Þ
T 2  T 1
ds:
Now we proceed to relate the market risk premium (4.2) to
the market power pðt;T 1;T 2Þ. Comparing the expressions
of F
h given by (4.1) and F
p calculated in Proposition 3.1,
we have that the sum of the last two terms of F
p must
match the sum of the two last terms of F
h. Hence, we must


































/jðcc  bjðs;T 1;T 2ÞÞds  






/jð cpr  bjðs;T 1;T 2ÞÞds: ð4:3Þ
We have n þ m unknown functions hB;i and hL;j,
i ¼ 1;...;m;j ¼ 1;...;n. If the market consists of k con-
tracts with non-overlapping delivery periods, we may ﬁnd
a solution as long as k 6 m þ n. We need at least one solu-
tion h ¼ð hB;hLÞ in order to have an arbitrage-free market
of forward contracts. Suppose for instance that n ¼ 0, that
is, there are no jumps in the market. In this case we have k
linear equations for the m unknown functions where we
ﬁnd at least one solution as long as k 6 m and the mean
reversion coeﬃcients ai are diﬀerent. If m > 0 and n > 0
we have both diﬀusion and jumps in the model, and we
may simply choose hL;j freely, and then solve for the
remaining unknowns hB;j given by Eq. (4.3) for each k
delivery periods. There is at least one solution when
k 6 m for this situation whenever the ai’s are diﬀerent.
One way is to choose hL;jðtÞ¼0, which means that there
is no price for jump risk incurred by the market, see for
example (Merton, 1990). We remark in passing that if we
chose a spot model with just two factors (for example
m ¼ n ¼ 1), and the market trades in more than two for-
ward contracts, there may be no solution to the Eq. (4.3)
for all the diﬀerent contracts at once. Solving the equations
in (4.3) for each contract separately leads to solutions
which are dependent on the delivery period, and will not
give one risk neutral measure for the market as a whole,
but one measure for each contract separately; allowing
for arbitrage opportunities.
In the rest of this section we look at two illustrative
examples to gain further insights into the model before
applying it to German data in Section 5. First we shall
demonstrate that for a simple Poisson jump model and
constant market power, the market risk premium changes
sign across time. Second, we explore the case of ﬁxed time
delivery without the presence of jumps and look explicitly
at how pðt;TÞ depends on the parameters pðt;TÞ, cpr and cc.
4.1. An example with constant market power and poisson
jumps
We consider a forward market consisting of 52 contracts
with weekly delivery. The market power is supposed to be
F.E. Benth et al./Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (2008) 2006–2021 2013 8constant pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼p 2½ 0;1 . Assume that the spot
model has m ¼ 52 diﬀusion components X iðtÞ, and one
(n ¼ 1) jump component YðtÞ. Suppose that the seasonal
function is
KðtÞ¼150 þ 20cosð2pt=365Þ;
and the mean-reversion parameters for the diﬀusion com-





i ¼ 1;...;52. We mimic here a sequence of mean-reverting
processes with decreasing speeds of mean reversion and
with decreasing volatility. Note that a speed of mean rever-
sion equal to 0.067 means that a shock will be halved over
10 days. The jump process is driven by LðtÞ¼gNðtÞ, where
NðtÞ is a Poisson process with intensity k and the jump size
is constant, equal to g. The mean-reversion for the jump
component is b ¼ 0:5, meaning that a jump will, on aver-
age, revert back in two days. Thus, we have a combination
of slow mean reverting normal variations and fast mean
reverting spikes in the spot market. The frequency of spikes
is set to k ¼ 2=365, i.e. two spikes, on average, per year.
Time t ¼ 0 corresponds to January 1, and we assume that
the initial spot price is Sð0Þ¼172. In our empirical inves-
tigations, we let X1ð0Þ¼2, and X ið0Þ¼Yð0Þ¼0 for
i ¼ 2;...;52 to achieve this. The risk aversion coeﬃcients
of the producer and consumer are set equal to
cc ¼ cpr ¼ 0:5. In the examples below we derive forward
curves for weakly settled forward contracts over a year.
We remark that this model is chosen for its simplicity
and to illustrate the approach in this paper.
Consider ﬁrst a positive jump of size g ¼ 10. In Fig. 1 we
have plotted the indiﬀerence forward curves for the pro-
ducer and consumer (‘ ’), together with the forward curves
with constant market power equal to p = 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75
(marked as dashed lines, in increasing order). Finally, we
have included the forecasted spot price curve as ‘+’. We
clearly see that the forecasted price curve follows a shape
similar to the seasonal function, while the indiﬀerence price
curves have very diﬀerent shapes in the short end. As
expected, market clearing forward prices are increasing
with increasing market power, since the producer will com-
mand higher prices with more power. Note also that for a
low market power of 0.25, we still observe that the fore-
casted price curve is below the forward curve in the shorter
end, while in the medium to long end we see the opposite.
This corresponds to a positive market risk premium in the
shorter end, whereas it becomes negative in the medium
and longer end. Both players have the same risk aversion,
and the consumer wishes to avoid upward jumps in the
price. Hence, even for a weak producer, the consumer is
willing to accept a positive market risk premium in the
short end. In the long end, the eﬀect of jumps vanish as a
consequence of mean reversion and the consumer will have
more power driving the market risk premium below zero.
To illustrate this particular example with p = 0.5 we have
plotted the diﬀerence of the forward curve with market
power 0.25 and the forecasted curve in Fig. 2. For the con-
tracts with delivery up to approximately week 20, the mar-
ket premium is positive. The premium decreases with time
to delivery, and becomes negative in the medium and long
end.
Turning our attention to the case of negative jumps, we
observe the reverse picture. Suppose that jumps sizes are
ﬁxed at g =  10. Fig. 3 shows the corresponding forward
and indiﬀerence curves together with the forecasted price.
We observe ﬁrst of all that all curves are shifted down-
wards, indicating that the producer is willing to accept
lower forward prices to hedge the possibility of sudden
drops in prices. In the short-term we observe, for all cases
of market power, that the forecasted spot price is above
forward prices, i.e. negative market risk premium. In the
long-term, only when producer’s market power is high,
that is 0.75, we have the situation where the forecasted
curve is below the forward curve signaling that the con-
sumer bears a positive risk premium. Moreover, Fig. 4









Fig. 1. The indiﬀerence price curves together with the forward curves for market powers equal to p ¼ 0:25;0:5 and p ¼ 0:75, in increasing order. The
forecasted curve is depicted ‘+’. The jumps are positive of size 10.
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forecasted curve when the producer’s market power is
p = 0.75.
We now proceed to analyze more closely the implica-
tions of jumps and normal variations of the model. We
consider the case with m = n = 1 and constant market
power pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼p for p 2½ 0;1 . Further, let
LðtÞ¼NðtÞ, a Poisson process with constant jump intensity
k > 0. Note that this model has only two factors, and in
general it will not give an arbitrage-free forward curve
dynamics for a market which trades in contracts with many
diﬀerent delivery periods. However, this simpliﬁcation pro-
vides us with some insight into how the sign of the market
risk premium may change, and we include it with the
assumption that we have one forward contract with deliv-
ery period ½T 1;T 2  traded in the market.
Consider Eq. (4.3). One way to solve this is to separate
the Wiener and jump part, and solve the two resulting




pðcpr þ ccÞ cpr
  
r
2ðtÞ  aðt;T 1;T 2Þ; ð4:4Þ
for t 6 T 2. Note that the sign of hB depends on the sign of
pðcpr þ ccÞ cpr, since r2ðtÞ and   aðt;T 1;T 2Þ are positive. We





If for instance cpr ¼ cc, the market price of risk hB becomes
negative whenever p < 0.5, which corresponds to the con-
sumer being the strongest. If the producer is stronger, i.e.
p > 0.5, he is the superior power in forming prices and the










Fig. 2. The market risk premium given by the diﬀerence of the forward curve with market power 0.25 and the forecasted curve.









Fig. 3. The indiﬀerence price curves together with the forward curves for market powers equal to p ¼ 0:25;0:5 and p ¼ 0:75, in increasing order. The
forecasted curve is depicted with ‘*’. The jumps are negative of size 10.
F.E. Benth et al./Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (2008) 2006–2021 2015 10market price of risk becomes positive. If cpr 6¼ cc, the market
power needs to be less than the relative risk aversion of the
produceragainstthetotalriskaversionforhB tobenegative.
Let us consider the market price of jump risk. Since LðtÞ
is assumed to be a Poisson process, the log-moment gener-
ating function is given by
/ðxÞ¼kðe





0ðhLðtÞÞ   /
0ð0Þ¼kðe
hLðtÞ   1Þ
which is positive whenever hLðtÞ > 0, and negative if
hLðtÞ < 0, as expected following the interpretation of Cor-
ollary 4.3. The equation for the jump risk derived from
splitting (4.3) into two equations becomes (after diﬀerenti-
ating with respect to t)
ke
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cc  bðt;T1;T2Þ   1
  
þ
1   p
cpr
1   e
 cpr  bðt;T1;T2Þ
  
: ð4:6Þ
Note that the right-hand side of (4.6) is positive since





cc  bðt;T1;T2Þ   1
  
þ
1   p
cpr
1   e
 cpr  bðt;T1;T2Þ
  
<   bðt;T 1;T 2Þ;
and positive otherwise. The following Lemma is helpful in
understanding when the market price of jump risk is
negative.






ccz   1Þþ
1   p
cpr
ð1   e
 cprzÞ;










then fðzÞ < z for z 6 z0, and fðzÞ P z otherwise, where z0 is
deﬁned by fðzÞ¼z.
Proof. Observe that fð0Þ¼0, and fðzÞ!1 whenever
z !1 . Moreover, f is monotonically increasing since
f
0ðzÞ¼pe
ccz þð 1   pÞe




ccz  ð 1   pÞcpre
 cprz;
which is positive whenever p > cpr=ðcc þ cprÞ. In that case,
f 0ðzÞ is an increasing function, and since f 0ð0Þ¼1, we ﬁnd
that f 0ðzÞ P 1, and therefore fðzÞ P z for all z P 0. This
proves the ﬁrst claim. When p < cpr=ðcc þ cprÞ, we will have
that f 00ðzÞ < 0 for z 6 b z, where b z is some positive constant,
while f 00ðzÞ > 0 elsewhere. Thus, f 0ðzÞ is decreasing, and
next increasing. Since it goes to inﬁnity as an exponential,
we need to have that there exists z0 > 0 for which
fðz0Þ¼z0. The second claim follows. h
Let z ¼   bðt;T 1;T 2Þ in the Lemma above, and recall that
by the deﬁnition of   bðt;T 1;T 2Þ it is increasing in t 6 T 1 and
decreasing in T 1 < t 6 T 2. Its maximum is in t ¼ T 1, where
it takes the value   bðT 1;T 1;T 2Þ¼ð 1   e bðT2 T1ÞÞ=b. If this
maximum is less than z0, the jump risk hLðt;T 1;T 2Þ will










Fig. 4. The market risk premium given by the diﬀerence of the forward curve with market power 0.75 and the forecasted curve.
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maximum is greater than z0. Observe that   bð0;T 1;T 2Þ¼
ðe bT1   e bT2Þ=b and   bðT 2;T 1;T 2Þ¼0. If   bð0;T 1;T 2Þ P
z0, there exists one t0 such that   bðt0;T 1;T 2Þ¼z0. In this
case we ﬁnd that hLðt;T 1;T 2Þ > 0 for t < t0, and
hLðt;T 1;T 2Þ < 0 for t > t0.I f  bð0;T 1;T 2Þ < z0, we have
the existence of t0 < t1 being such that   bðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼z0,
t ¼ t0;t1. Then hLðt;T 1;T 2Þ is negative for t 6 t0, positive
on the interval t 2ð t0;t1Þ and negative again on t 2ð t1;T 2Þ.
Therefore, we may have a situation where the market
price of jump risk becomes positive giving a positive con-
tribution to the forward price which makes it larger than
the forecasted spot, even in the presence of a negative
contribution to the forward price coming from hB.I ti s
also interesting to see that on the forward curve we can
have diﬀerent signs of the market risk premium depending
on how far away from maturity we are on the curve. This
change of sign in the market risk premium may only take
place when jumps are present in the model, and when the
market power of the producer is weaker than his relative
risk aversion to the sum of both risk aversion coeﬃcients,
see (4.5). Note that when jumps are not present in the
spot price, and we have assumed that the market price
of risk is constant, the market risk premium will only
be either positive or negative, depending on the size of
the market power. In general, if we assume that there is
only one factor driving the dynamics of the spot price,
then the market price of risk ought to change signs in
order to get a change in the sign of the market risk pre-
mium. Furthermore, if we assume that the market price
of risk (per factor) is constant, then we need at least
two factors to observe a change in the sign of the market
risk premium.
4.2. Fixed-delivery forwards without spike risk
To gain further insight into the forward curves implied
by the certainty equivalence principle and market power,
we consider a spot market without spikes and with a con-
stant level to which the prices mean-revert. Thus, we con-
sider the spot price model
dSðtÞ¼ð l   aSðtÞÞdt þ rdBðtÞ;
where l is a constant, a > 0, r P 0, which yields the expli-
cit solution
SðTÞ¼SðtÞe
 aðT tÞ þ
l
a
1   e

























P exp ccSðTÞ ðÞ j Ft ½  :
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1   e
 2aðT tÞ   
: ð4:8Þ





c ðt;TÞþð 1   pðt;TÞÞF
cp
prðt;TÞð 4:9Þ
and a simple calculation implies that
F
pðt;TÞ¼SðtÞe
 aðT tÞ þ
l
a
1   e




1   e
 2aðT tÞ   
þð 1   pðt;TÞÞcc
r2
4a
1   e
 2aðT tÞ   
;
and the market risk premium becomes
pðt;TÞ¼ cc   pðt;TÞðcp þ ccÞ
   r2
4a
1   e
 2aðT tÞ   
:
It is straightforward to see that the sign of pðt;TÞ is given
by the sign of ðcc   pðt;TÞðcp þ ccÞÞ. Therefore, when
pðt;TÞ < cc=ðcp þ ccÞ we have that pðt;TÞ > 0 and vice
versa.



















and observe that the forward price consists of three terms,
a ‘‘constant” level, a ‘‘slow” mean-reversion level
expð aðT   tÞÞ and a ‘‘fast” mean-reversion level
expð 2aðT   tÞÞ. Moreover, if we assume a constant mar-





then the last term in (4.10) will be exponentially increasing
towards zero. Further, if SðtÞ > l=a, then the
expð aðT   tÞÞ-term will be ‘‘slowly” decreasing to zero.
In eﬀect, we produce a hump in the forward curve. This
hump will be in the short end of the curve.
5. Empirical evidence: The German market
In this section we apply our model to the German elec-
tricity market. We do this in two steps. First we estimate
the physical parameters of a two-factor model. Second,
F.E. Benth et al./Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (2008) 2006–2021 2017 12using forward market data, denoted by Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ, we esti-
mate the risk-aversion coeﬃcients for both producers and
consumers and estimate the producer’s market power.
We employ daily spot prices, the so-called Phelix base
load traded at the EEX, and prices for forward contracts
with diﬀerent delivery periods: monthly, quarterly and
yearly. Our data covers the period January 2 2002 to Jan-
uary 1 2006 where we have 1461 spot price observations.
The forward data consist of 108 contracts with monthly
delivery, 35 contracts with quarterly delivery and 12 con-
tracts with yearly delivery.
We apply the model to
SðtÞ¼KðtÞþXðtÞþYðtÞ
where, as described above, KðtÞ is the seasonal component,
dXðtÞ¼  aXðtÞdt þ rdBðtÞ
dYðtÞ¼  bYðtÞdt þ dLðtÞ






is a compound Poisson process. NðtÞ is a homogeneous
Poisson process with intensity k and Ji’s are i.i.d. with
exponential density function
fðjÞ¼pk1e
 k1j1j>0 þð 1   pÞk2e
 k2jjj1j<0;
where k1 > 0 and k2 > 0 are responsible for the decay of
the tails for the distribution of positive and negative jump
sizes and 1 is the indicator function. Finally we assume that
NðtÞ, J and BðtÞ are independent.
We remark in passing that a two-factor model as we
consider here will in general violate the no-arbitrage condi-
tion for the forward market if this consists of more than
two contracts (recall the discussion in Section 4). However,
the purpose of the empirical study is to provide an insight
into the market power and the market risk premium, and
thus we choose a simple and tractable model to analyze.
We may, on the other hand, to be consistent with the no-
arbitrage conditions mentioned above, split the Brownian
motion part of XðtÞ into several factors to ensure an arbi-
trage-free market as required by our conditions above.
Therefore, this means that we must choose the same num-
ber of Brownian motions as number of contracts and our
results to follow will not change with this modiﬁcation.
To be able to estimate the seasonal component and the
parameters of the OU and jump processes we follow a pro-
cedure similar to that in Cartea and Figueroa (2005) and
Lucı ´a and Schwartz (2002). Therefore, for the seasonal
component we assume




t þ a6 ðÞ
  
þ a7t;
where the indicator function is acting on the diﬀerent days
of the week. The parameter estimates for the seasonal com-
ponent are shown in Table 1 and the estimates for the OU
and Jump components are shown in Table 2.
5 Moreover,
Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, skewness
and kurtosis of the spot prices and those resulting from
10,000 paths using our model and Fig. 5 shows the realized
and a simulated path. It is clear that our model captures
both statistical and trajectile properties.
In order to calculate the market power pðt;T 1;T 2Þ and
the forward premium pðt;T 1;T 2Þ we need to choose the risk
aversion coeﬃcients for the consumer and the producer, cc
and cpr, respectively. Since F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ (upper bound) and
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ (lower bound) depend on the choice of cc and
cpr, we estimate cpr and cc by minimizing the distance
between F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ, F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ and the market prices
of forwards Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ, respectively, in the following way.
We examine the time range t ¼ 1 ¼ 02=Jan=2002 until
t ¼ 1461 ¼ 31=Dec=2005. For most days (excluding week-
ends and holidays) we have prices for forward contracts
with delivery one month, three months (quarter) and
twelve months (year). As long as there is a price on day
t, we determine all values of cpr and cc such that
F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ 6 Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ 6 F prðt;T 1;T 2Þð 5:2Þ
and introduce intervals which contain the risk aversion





c containing values for cpr and cc by
guaranteeing that (5.2) holds. Thus, to ﬁnd the ranges for
the parameters of risk aversion we implement the following
algorithm:





F prð1;T 1;T 2Þ 6 Fð1;T 1;T 2Þ 6 F cð1;T 1;T 2Þ, for all deliv-
ery periods ½T 1;T 2 , traded on day 1.
Table 1
Estimated coeﬃcients of KðtÞ
a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 Squared
error
19.43  11.43 0.78 2.13  6.13 1.2 53.64 0.016 39420.74
Table 2
Parameter estimates for OU and jump components
ar p kk 1 k2 b
0.44 5.2 0.72 0.054 0.031 0.053 0.2
Table 3
Empirical ad simulated moments (1000 paths)
Mean Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Empirical SðtÞ 31.6 15.2 2.7 14.5
Simulated SðtÞ 32.1 15.6 2.2 13.8
5 For more details on the estimation procedure see (Metka, 2007).





F prð2;T 1;T 2Þ 6 Fð2;T 1;T 2Þ 6 F cð2;T 1;T 2Þ, for all deliv-
ery periods ½T 1;T 2 , traded on day 2.
  ...





that F prð1461;T 1;T 2Þ6Fð1461;T 1;T 2Þ6F cð1461;T 1;T 2Þ,
for all delivery periods ½T 1;T 2 , traded on day 1461.
This algorithm guarantees that no forward prices
Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ will lay outside the bounds F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ and
F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ. Consequently the results show that
cpr 2½ 0:421;1Þ and cc 2½ 0:701;1Þ. In our calculations
we choose cpr ¼ 0:421 and cc ¼ 0:701 which seems a rea-
sonable working assumption where producers are less
risk-averse than consumers.
We continue by recalling that the market power and
market risk premium are given by
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼
Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ
F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ F prðt;T 1;T 2Þ
and
pðt;T 1;T 2Þ¼Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ E
P 1






To calculate pðt;T 1;T 2Þ and pðt;T 1;T 2Þ we split the data
in three non-overlapping periods. Table 4 lists the contracts
we employ in every period. The key criterion is to include
in the ﬁrst period all contracts that were being traded on
January 2 2002. Then the second period starts when all
contracts that were being traded on January 2 2002 are
no longer traded. Finally, the third period is deﬁned in a
similar way.
Figs. 6–8 show our results when all forward contracts
that were being traded on January 2 2002 are taken into
account. In other words we show the results from 18
monthly contracts, 7 quarterly contracts and 3 yearly con-
tracts (see Table 4).
In particular, Fig. 6 shows the results for the 18 monthly
contracts that were trading on January 2 2002. As expected
we observe a decline in the producer’s market power as
time to delivery increases. For example, in the contract
with delivery period closest to January 2 2002 the pro-
ducer’s market power is slightly over 0.80 and decreases
to values below 0.30 corresponding to contracts that start
delivery on or after March 2003. Moreover, Figs. 7 and 8
show the same behavior: a decaying market power for pro-




t Type # Contracts Delivery periods Fðt;T 1;T 2Þ
01/Jan/2002 Monthly 18 Jan 2002–May 2003 Fð2;T 1;T 2Þ
01/Jan/2002 Quarterly 7 2nd qtr 2002–4th qtr 2003 Fð2;T 1;T 2Þ
01/Jan/2002 Yearly 3 2003–2005 Fð2;T 1;T 2Þ
03/Mar/2003 Monthly 7 Feb 2003–Aug 2003 Fð400;T 1;T 2Þ
03/Mar/2003 Quarterly 7 2nd qtr 2003–4th qtr 2004 Fð400;T 1;T 2Þ
03/Mar/2003 Yearly 3 2004–2006 Fð400;T 1;T 2Þ
04/Oct/2005 Monthly 7 Oct 2005–Apr 2006 Fð1373;T 1;T 2Þ
04/Oct/2005 Quarterly 7 1st qtr 2006–3rd qtr 2007 Fð1373;T 1;T 2Þ
04/Oct/2005 Yearly 6 2006–2011 Fð1373;T 1;T 2Þ






























Fig. 5. Spot and simulated spot prices.












































































































































































































Fig. 8. Producer’s market power and market risk premium, 3 yearly contracts with t = 2002.
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above, the producer’s market power is much higher in
the short end for monthly contracts, Fig. 6, than for quar-
terly and yearly, Figs. 7 and 8. In the short-term, the pres-
ence of jumps incentivies consumer’s to hedge against risk
produced by upward spikes, i.e. exert upward pressure on
demand for forwards, whilst at the same time, producer’s
have less incentives to sell forwards when positive spikes
are present. Hence, we see that monthly forward contracts,
that start delivery relatively soon, trade at a high market
risk premium which in our framework is also reﬂected in
a high market power for producers. Furthermore, the fur-
ther away the start of the delivery period is, the presence of
price spikes, due to the fast mean reverting nature of the
spot price, poses negligible risks. This situation is evident
in the term structure of the producer’s market power and
market risk premium obtained from the quarterly and
yearly contracts which are roughly the same in both cases
(see Figs. 7 and 8).
We also depict results for the market risk premium. We
see that the risk premium pðt;T 1;T 2Þ shows a clear term
structure. As expected, pðt;T 1;T 2Þ is decreasing in
½T 1;T 2 , i.e. the further the delivery of the contract is, the
smaller the risk premium. In our model, this result can be
explained by the decreasing market power that producers
have; the larger the diﬀerence T 1   t, the keener producers
will be, relative to consumers, to trade forwards. Hence,
forward prices will move away from the upper bound
F cðt;T 1;T 2Þ. As a result, the risk premium pðt;T 1;T 2Þ is
decreasing, and at some point in time, it becomes negative.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the point in time where
the risk premium changes its sign. When looking at the
term structure of pðt;T 1;T 2Þ obtained from monthly and
quarterly contracts we see that the change of sign occurs
around the months of April and May.
6. Conclusions
In this article we address the important question of what
gives rise to the market risk premium. We provide a frame-
work that allows us to explain how risk preferences of mar-
ket players explain the sign and magnitude of the market
risk premium across diﬀerent forward contract maturities.
A crucial step in our framework is to be able to incorporate
the relative eagerness consumers and producers show, via
their respective representative agents, to enter forward con-
tracts. We show that there is an attainable set where con-
sumers and producers are willing to strike a deal, but it is
this eagerness to hedge risk across diﬀerent points in time,
which we label market power, what singles out a unique
equilibrium price for each forward contract.
Furthermore, these equilibrium prices that belong to the
attainable set must clearly correspond to those obtained
from pricing forwards under a risk-neutral measure. There-
fore, as an illustration of our approach, we looked at
wholesale electricity prices and were able to make an expli-
cit analytical connection between the market prices of risk
and market power with the degrees of risk aversion of the
representative agents. To exemplify our methodology fur-
ther, we looked at particular examples where it was
straightforward to see how diﬀerent sources of risk, for
instance jump or diﬀusion risk, contribute to the market
risk premium and we were able to obtain and explain the
very distinctive characteristics observed in electricity mar-
kets as well as in other markets such as gas, oil, etc.
We apply our model to the German electricity market.
Our empirical results endorse our theoretical predictions.
For instance, we ﬁnd that over short-term horizons, and
in the presence of spike risk, producer’s market power is
at its highest. For example, in the contracts with delivery
period closest to January 2 2002 the producer’s market
power is around 0.80 and decreases to values below 0.30
corresponding to contracts that start delivery on or after
March 2003. This situation is also reﬂected in the market
risk premium. Monthly contracts that mature in the near
future, trade at a high premium, ﬁgures in excess of 15
Euros. And monthly contracts that start delivery in a rela-
tively long period of time, for instance in 6 months or
longer, trade most of the time, at a high discount.
Finally, we generally observe that for each class of con-
tract (monthly, quarterly or yearly) the producer’s market
power and the market risk premium show a term structure
that is decreasing as time to maturity of the forward con-
tract increases.
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